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THE FAILURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION IN MICHIGAN:  
AN ARGUMENT FOR AN INDIVIDUALIZED AND TREATMENT BASED APPROACH 
 
 
by 
Kaya Salwin 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“In political as well as natural disorders, the great error of those 
who commonly undertake either cure or preservation is that they 
rest in the second causes, without extending their search to the 
remote and original sources of evil.” 
Samuel Johnson1 
 
A house built on an improperly laid or unsupported foundation will be structurally 
unsound and inadequate to sustain severe weather or other environmental threats.  Although 
structural defects in an already standing home must be addressed, it is unquestionably more cost-
effective in the long run to identify the infirmities and prevent their reoccurrence in the 
construction of new homes.   
The current trend in juvenile justice is to get tough on crime.  An oft quoted campaign 
slogan is “commit an adult crime, do adult time.”  In Michigan, the legislature has coupled this 
catchy phrase with a juvenile justice reform package that seeks to make good on the promise by 
locking up early and for a long time children who display a propensity to commit crime.  To 
achieve this goal the Michigan legislature has adopted a waiver mechanism whereby juvenile 
offenders can be tried and sentenced as adults.  The idea seems to be that trying juveniles as 
adults will result in harsher sentences and a deterrent effect.  Unfortunately, this quick-fix 
solution has not ameliorated the problem.        
In reality, kids who are sent to the adult system are mostly nonviolent offenders who end 
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up serving little or no time.2  Alongside the violent adult offenders, juveniles often seem less 
threatening and are treated with a gentle hand.  Further, judges seem to be reluctant to send 
juveniles to the adult prisons for fear of what may happen to them.3  Research indicates that on 
the whole, juveniles who are sent to adult criminal court are treated more leniently than those in 
juvenile court.4 
How, then, can the Michigan legislature justify these policy decisions?  The answer is 
that it can not.  This paper examines the historical underpinnings of the juvenile court 
particularly its emphasis on rehabilitation.  Second, this paper discusses Michigan’s approach to 
juvenile justice by examining recent legislation, legislative history, and interpretive case law.  
Finally, this paper argues that Michigan’s approach is not working.  The studies and statistics 
establish that Michigan’s approach does not even come close to achieving the goal of decreasing 
juvenile crime.  Finally, suggestions will be made to improve the system so that it will achieve 
its goals and help some kids along the way. 
 
I.  A SYSTEM FOCUSED ON REHABILITATION: THE EARLY JUVENILE COURT 
 The first juvenile court was founded in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois.5  The juvenile 
court was based on parens patriae,6 the principle that the state must care fore those who cannot 
take care of themselves.7  Unlike the adult criminal court, the juvenile court formally rejected 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 Samuel Johnson, An Omnibus of His Wit and Wisdom (London: Carrel Brothers, 1966), 1:49. 
2 John J. Wilson and James C. Howell, U.S. Dept. of Justice, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS, CHRONIC, 
AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS 22-23 (1993) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY].  
3 See Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in 
Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1988). 
4 See id. 
5 See Charles J. Aron & Michele S.C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice at the Crossroads, CHAMPION, Jun. 1998, at 10-11. 
6 See id. 
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7 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). 
punishment as a means of handling juveniles who committed crimes.8  Instead, the juvenile 
system was designed to offer guidance, assistance, and treatment with the goal of rehabilitation 
and reintegration.9  To achieve these goals, the juvenile court exercised wide discretion, rejecting 
the formal procedures of the adult court.10      
 The juvenile court’s nonpunitive, discretionary methods, however, had a major flaw in 
that juveniles accused of crimes were not afforded due process protection in the courts.11  As a 
result, these juveniles were often arbitrarily and unfairly punished.12  The U.S. Supreme Court, in 
response, handed down two landmark rulings that would completely change the nature of the 
juvenile court by extending due process protections to juveniles.13   
 
A.  Kent v. United States14 
 The first Supreme Court case to dramatically change the juvenile justice system was Kent 
v. United States.15  In Kent, the defendant was sixteen years old when he was accused of entering 
the victim’s apartment, taking her wallet, and raping her.16  Anticipating that he might be 
transferred to adult court, the defendant filed a motion for a hearing regarding the suitability of 
transfer.  No hearing was held and the juvenile court judge, without explanation, transferred the 
defendant to adult court where he was sentenced to a total of thirty to ninety years in prison.17   
                                                 
8 See Klein, supra note 3, at 35.  To protect children from the stigma of adult prosecutions the juvenile was called a 
respondent instead of a defendant, they were adjudicated instead of found guilty, they were committed instead of 
sentenced, and a petition was filed instead of the juvenile being charged.  Id.   
9 See id. at 376. 
10 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 2, at 12. 
11 See Klein, supra note 5, at 377. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. at 376.  See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
14 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
15 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
16 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. 
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17 See id. at 550. 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court, recognizing that some juvenile courts lacked the 
personnel, facilities, and techniques to adequately act in a parens patriae capacity, stated that 
those in the juvenile justice system receive neither the protections given adults nor the care and 
treatment intended for children.  As such, the Court reversed the trial court, holding that due 
process required a juvenile be afforded both a hearing regarding a transfer to adult court and a 
statement of the reasons for the judge’s decision to transfer.18  In addition, the Court set forth the 
following  factors to be considered by judges in making transfer decisions:19 
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the 
protection of the community requires waiver. 
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner. 
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury 
resulted. 
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon 
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment . . .  
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when 
the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged 
with a crime in [adult court] . . .  
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration 
of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living. 
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts 
with . . . other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other 
jurisdictions,  prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to 
juvenile institutions.   
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of 
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the 
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently 
available to the Juvenile Court.     
 
B.  In re Gault20 
 One year after Kent, the Supreme Court handed down another landmark decision in In re 
                                                 
18 See id. at 557. 
19 See id. at 566-67. 
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20 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
Gault.21  The defendant in Gault was fifteen years old when he was arrested for making lewd 
telephone calls to a neighbor.  Upon his arrest, the defendant was detained and his parents were 
not notified.  The juvenile court held a series of informal hearings of which no records or 
transcripts were kept, the complaining witness was never present, and the defendant was denied 
right to counsel.  During these hearings, the judge questioned the defendant about the alleged 
calls and, subsequently, committed him to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 
twenty-one.22   
 The Supreme Court, on appeal, considered whether Gault was denied due process.  The 
Court emphasized that the juvenile justice system’s focus on discretion and individualized 
treatment has resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness and the denial of due 
process.23  The trial judge’s decision was reversed, and the Court held that juveniles must be 
afforded the same due process rights as adults, specifically: the right to notice of charges, the 
right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-
incrimination.24   
 
II.  MICHIGAN’S APPROACH TO JUVENILE JUSTICE 
 Commentators have argued that the advent of procedural safeguards in the juvenile court 
has changed it from an individualized, treatment-oriented model of juvenile justice to a more 
punitive, adult-like system.25  They contend that procedural protections interfere with the unique 
                                                 
21 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
22 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 7. 
23 See id. at 18-19.  The Court stated, “Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridles discretion, 
however, benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”  Id. at 18. 
24 See id. at 55. 
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25 See Klein, supra note 5, at 377.  See also Shannon F. McLatchey, Juvenile Crime and Punishment: An Analysis of 
the “Get Tough” Approach, 10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 406 (1999). 
nature and purpose of the juvenile court.26  Alternatively, other critics assert that juveniles are 
not afforded enough due process protections in the juvenile court.27  These critics advocate for 
the abolishment of the juvenile justice system in favor of placing all offenders in the adult 
criminal justice system where at least they will receive full due process protection.28 
 In addition to the procedural changes that have occurred in the juvenile courts, it appears 
that the focus of the juvenile system has changed.  Public fear and frustration have shifted the 
focus from protecting juvenile offenders to protecting society from the juvenile offenders.29  
Sadly, much of this is due to the media which sensationalizes violent juvenile crime.30  
Politicians have also found that a “get tough on crime” stance bolsters their ability to win 
elections and, as such, tougher treatment for juveniles convicted of crimes is a major focus for 
campaigns.31  Society has begun to view juvenile offenders as incapable of choosing between 
right and wrong.32  The cumulative result is that society is calling for more accountability from 
youthful offenders of all ages, and most states, especially Michigan, have heeded the call.33 
 Almost all fifty states, including Michigan, have amended their juvenile codes to allow 
                                                 
26 See id. at 381. 
27 See Catherine R. Guttman, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 514-15 (1995).  Noting that “[a]s more due process rights were guaranteed to juveniles, the 
juvenile court began to resemble more closely the adult criminal court in terms of formality.”  Id. at 514. 
28 See id. at 514-15. 
29 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 2, at 10 (“Increasingly, America’s youth are labeled as ‘parasitic,’ ‘animalistic,’ 
‘depraved,’ ‘super predators.’”  Id. 
30 See id.  See also Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research, 9 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 37, 37-38 (1997).  Eschholz reports that “[b]oth television and newspapers have been found to greatly 
overrepresent the incidence of violent crime [because] [c]rime stories are inexpensive, flashy, and politically safe.”  
Id. at 37-38. 
31 See Eschholz, supra note 25, at 38.  (“The candidates seldom debate substantial issues, such as the root causes of 
crime, but instead battle over who can be the toughest on crime, who will build more prisons, who will execute more 
inmates, and who will incarcerate more juveniles.”) 
32 See Aron & Hurley, supra note 2, at 10. 
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33 See Fox Butterfield, More States Try Juveniles as Adults, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 12, 1996, at A9.  (Nearly all 
fifty states have amended their statutes to allow more juveniles to be tried as adults, and the new laws were enacted 
because most people assume that juveniles will face more punishment and longer sentences in adult court.  See id.)  
See also, McLatchey, supra note 20, at 407.    
more youths to be tried and sentenced as adults.34  The goal of this “get tough” approach is to 
transfer more juveniles into the adult system, where they will presumably serve longer sentences 
under more punitive conditions.35  The transfer statutes adopted by the different states take three 
forms:  judicial waiver, prosecutorial waiver, or legislative waiver.36         
 Judicial waiver, or “traditional waiver,” permits a juvenile court judge to waive 
jurisdiction when, after a hearing, the judge determines that sufficient evidence supports the 
conclusion that the juvenile committed the charged offense and would not be amenable to 
juvenile court treatment.37  At the hearing, both the state and the juvenile, usually with the 
assistance of counsel, have an opportunity to present evidence to the judge regarding the 
juvenile’s amenability to juvenile court treatment.38  The judge must consider all of the evidence 
as well as a list of statutorily defined factors then gives a written opinion explaining the 
reasoning for the decision to waive or not to waive.39  The judge’s decision is then reviewable on 
appeal.40     
 Prosecutorial, or automatic, waiver is a mechanism giving prosecutors the authority to 
choose the forum in which to try the juvenile offenders.41  This is possible because both the 
juvenile and criminal courts have original jurisdiction over the juvenile by virtue of his or her 
age and the nature of the alleged crime.  The prosecutor is not required to file a petition with the 
court nor must he consider the juvenile’s best interests when making the charging decision.  
Instead, with no statutory guidance, the prosecutor may unilaterally and without justification 
                                                 
34 See Butterfield, supra note 28 at A9. 
35 See id. 
36 See Guttman, supra note 22, at 520. 
37 Stacy Sabo, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 
2436 (1996). 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 2438 
40 See id. at 2439. 
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decide to charge the juvenile in juvenile or adult court and, at least in Michigan, that charging 
decision may carry with it a mandatory sentence from which the judge may not stray.42   
 Finally, legislative waiver categorically excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction certain 
juveniles or offenses.43  These cases must be tried in the criminal court.  The criteria for 
exclusion can include age of the juvenile, type of offense, or previous convictions.44  Legislative 
waiver, therefore, targets a type of offense and, except for the juvenile’s age, does not consider 
the juvenile’s individual circumstances.  This type of waiver excludes juveniles on purely 
statutory criteria and is not discretionary.  The rationale behind legislative waiver is basically to  
charge serious, violent, or persistent juveniles like adult criminals.45  
 
A. Michigan’s 1996 Juvenile Justice Reform Legislation 
 Michigan’s juvenile system was originally based on two major principles:  first the 
juvenile court would act in loco parentis; second, the juvenile court would not maintain the 
degree of formality that exists in the adult court.  The informality which was representative of 
the juvenile court was overruled by the US Supreme Court in Kent v. United States46 and In re 
Gault47 which required juveniles be afforded their due process rights in juvenile proceedings.  
Michigan designed its system specially to address society’s recognition that juvenile offenders 
have special needs that were not being met in the adult system.  As such‚ the juvenile system has 
traditionally emphasized rehabilitation, counseling, and specialized services. 
The juvenile system, as it was created, did not provide options for long-term 
                                                                                                                                                             
41 See id. 
42 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.1(f)(1) and § 12A.1(1). 
43 See Sabo, supra note 32, at 2444. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. at 2445. 
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incarceration.  Michigan, therefore, has adopted two different approaches to deal with youth who 
have committed particularly egregious crimes:  traditional waiver and automatic (prosecutorial) 
waiver.  Prior to the passage of the 1996 amendment to the Juvenile Justice Reform Act, the 
juvenile division of the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles under the age of 
seventeen who committed criminal offenses.48  Known as the “traditional waiver” rule, this Act 
provided that juvenile court judges, upon motion of the prosecutor, could waive jurisdiction over 
fifteen and sixteen-year-old offenders.49  In making such a determination, the judge was required 
to conduct a hearing in which the following six statutory factors had to be considered:  
(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense;  
(2) The culpability of the juvenile; 
(3) The prior record of the juvenile 
(4) The history of the juvenile in participating in available 
programs; 
(5) The adequacy of both punishment and programs available in 
the juvenile system; and 
(6) The dispositional options available for the juvenile.50     
 
In 1996, the legislature adopted the “automatic waiver” process whereby prosecutors are 
given the unilateral and unchecked authority to “waive” juveniles who have committed a 
“specified offense” to the circuit court to be tried as adults.51  This is possible because the 
legislation gives original jurisdiction over juvenile offenders as young as age fourteen to both the 
                                                                                                                                                             
46 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
47 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
48 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.1(1). 
49 See id.  
50 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(4)(a)-(f). 
51 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.1(f)(1).  A “specified juvenile violation” includes the following:  (1) arson of a 
dwelling; (2) assault with intent to commit murder; (3) assault with intent to maim; (4) assault with intent to rob and 
steal while armed; (5) attempted murder; (6) first-degree murder; (7) second-degree murder; (8) kidnapping; (9) 
first-degree criminal sexual conduct; (10) armed robbery; (11) carjacking; (12) bank, safe, or vault robbery; (13) 
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, if armed with a dangerous weapon; (14) home invasion 
if armed with a dangerous weapon; (15) escape from certain higher-security juvenile facilities; (16) manufacture, 
delivery, or possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of a controlled substance; (17) possession of over 650 
grams of a controlled substance; (18) an attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation to commit any of 
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family division of the circuit court and the circuit court.52  The prosecutor then has the discretion 
to choose the forum in which to bring the charges.53 
If the prosecutor opts to charge a juvenile as an adult, the prosecutor is required to 
establish that there is probable cause to support the charges before the case will be bound over to 
the circuit court.54  As in traditional adult proceedings, if the district court finds there is no 
probable cause to charge the juvenile, the charges must be dismissed.  Once a prosecutor 
exercises his or her discretion and the juvenile is bound over to circuit court, the circuit court 
judge is required to sentence a juvenile convicted of any of the following specified crimes in the 
same manner as an adult: (a) arson of a dwelling; (b) assault with intent to murder; (c) assault 
with intent to maim; (d) attempted murder; (e) conspiracy to commit murder; (f) solicitation to 
commit murder; (g) first-degree murder; (h) second-degree murder; (i) kidnapping; (j) first-
degree criminal sexual conduct; (k) armed robbery; and (l) carjacking.55  Unlike the judge’s 
waiver decision, the prosecutor is not required to consider any specified factors or to conduct a 
formal hearing before making the decision to waive jurisdiction.  Indeed, under the theory of 
“prosecutorial discretion,”56 the prosecutor’s decision to charge in circuit court is given 
deference and will be reversed only if there was an abuse of power.57 
 The crimes requiring an adult sentence are included in the list of specified violations for 
                                                                                                                                                             
the above offenses; (19) any lesser-included offenses or other offenses arising out of the same transaction, if the 
juvenile is charged with one of the above offenses. 
52 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(a)(1). 
53 See id. 
54 See People v. Conat, 238 Mich. App. 134, 150, 605 N.W.2d 49, 58 (1999). 
55 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.1.1(a)-(f). 
56 See Genessee Prosecutor v. Genessee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich. 672, 683-684, 194 N.W.2d 693 (1972).  (the 
prosecutor is constitutionally entrusted with authority to charge the defendant.) 
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57 See People v. Barksdale, 219 Mich. App. 484, 488, 556 N.W.2d 521 (1996).  (An abuse of power may be defined 
as a situation in which the charging decision was made for reasons that are unconstitutional, illegal, or ultra vires.) 
which a juvenile may be automatically waived by the prosecutor to circuit court.58  However, not 
all of the specified juvenile offenses require an adult sentence.  Therefore, if the juvenile is 
convicted of a crime which does not require an adult sentence, the judge is required to hold a 
hearing to determine whether to sentence the juvenile as a juvenile or as an adult.59  
Under the current system, if the juvenile offender has committed an offense which is not 
included in the specified list of offenses, the traditional waiver process may still be followed.60  
If the juvenile is convicted under this process, the probate judge retains discretion in handing 
down an adult sentence.61  Alternatively, if charged with a crime that requires an adult sentence 
under the automatic waiver provision, the prosecutor’s charging decision determines the 
juvenile’s sentence if convicted.62  
 
B.  The Constitutionality of Automatic Waiver:  People v. Conat 
In People v. Conat.,63 the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the 
automatic waiver provision of Michigan’s 1996 Juvenile Justice Reform Act.64  The defendants 
in Conat argued that “automatic waiver” violates the constitutional principles of equal 
protection, due process, and separation of powers.65  At trial, the circuit court ruled in favor of 
the defendants, holding that the automatic waiver was indeed unconstitutional.66  On appeal by 
the prosecutors, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s rulings on the separation of 
powers, equal protection and due process issues, thereby affirming the constitutionality of the 
                                                 
58 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.1f. 
59 See MICH. COMP. LAWS  § 769.1(3). 
60 See supra note 71.   
61 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.1(3). 
62 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.1(1). 
63 238 Mich. App. 134, 605 N.W.2d 49 (1999). 
64 MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 769.1 (2000). 
65 See 238 Mich. App. at 144, 605 N.W.2d at 55. 
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automatic waiver.67  In April 2000, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to grant the application 
for leave to appeal filed by defendants.68      
Michael Conat’s case was originally decided in the Oakland County Circuit Court on 
March 8, 1999.  Conat, who was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged offenses, was charged 
with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.  The 
prosecutor elected to charge Conat as an adult pursuant to section 764.1(f)(1).69  Because the 
first-degree murder charge fell within the list of enumerated offenses in section 764.1,70 the 
circuit court would have been required to sentence Conat in the same manner as an adult if he 
had been convicted.71 
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s ruling that Michigan’s 
automatic waiver provision is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers‚ due process 
and equal protection and the case was remanded for trial.72  Conat was a consolidation of four 
circuit court decisions that held the juvenile waiver provision unconstitutional.73  All four 
defendants were charged with specified crimes that would require the court to impose an adult 
sentence upon conviction.74  At the circuit court level, each of the defendants successfully moved 
for the court to find that the juvenile waiver provision was unconstitutional.75  Prosecutors 
appealed in three cases by leave granted and in one as of right.76   
                                                                                                                                                             
66 See People v. Conat, Circuit Court Case 
67 See People v. Conat, 238 Mich. App. 134, 605 N.W.2d 49 (1999). 
68 See People v. Conat, 238 Mich. App. 134, 605 N.W.2d 49 (1999) (cert. denied). 
69 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.1(f)(1). 
70 See infra note 76. 
71 See id.  
72 See Conat‚ 238 Mich. App. at 141‚ 605 N.W.2d at 54.   
73 See id. at 144, 605 N.W.2d at 55. 
74 See id.  Defendants Michael Conat and Stephen Raines were accused of murder, and Defendants Sarah Plumb and 
Derek Schroeder were accused of armed robbery. 
75 See id.  The constitutional issues raised in the four circuit court cases included challenges based on ripeness, 
separation of powers, due process, and equal protection. 
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76 See id.   
The issues presented on appeal included challenges based on ripeness, separation of 
powers, equal protection, and due process.  The court of appeals held that the statute did not 
violate the constitutional separation of powers because the trial courts retained their sentencing 
power, and the courts should not interfere with the prosecution’s broad charging discretion.77  
Likewise, the court found no violation of equal protection based on the fact that for the same 
offense some juveniles would be charged and sentenced differently than other juveniles.78  
Finally, the court held that there was no violation of due process because there is no requirement 
that there be a hearing before an automatic waiver is filed by the prosecution.79   
In its due process analysis, the court asserted that juveniles have no constitutional right to 
be treated as juveniles.  Indeed, the court noted that at common law, juveniles at least fourteen 
years of age were presumed to be capable of criminal intent and were, therefore, subject to the 
same criminal penalties as adults.  The court concluded that the ‘juvenile court’s jurisdiction is, 
by implication, something that is purely the creation of the legislature.’80 
Further, the Conat court held that due process did not require a hearing prior to a trial on 
an automatic waiver case and that the requirements of Kent v. United States did not apply 
because Kent was not decided under the automatic waiver system.  The court’s holding, 
however, disregarded the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Fields81 where it noted 
that, “[i]t is important to understand the precise issue in this case.  It is not whether constitutional 
requirements of due process stated in Kent v. United States  . . . were met.  Rather, it is whether 
the lack of standards in the statute  preclude a waiver proceeding.”  The Fields court went on to 
                                                 
77 See id. at 61. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id.  
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81 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1972). 
hold that if the legislature decide to treat some children under the age of seventeen differently 
from the entire class of such people, excluding them from the beneficient processes and purposes 
of the juvenile courts, the legislature must establish suitable and ascertainable standards to 
determine which persons are to be deemed adults and treated as such.82  Based on this holding, 
the Conat court should have found the statute unconstitutional because it lacks any standards.   
The modern trend in Michigan juvenile justice is to inflict on youth the punishment 
previously reserved for adults without any of the due process reserved for either adults or the 
protections reserved for children in Kent, Gault and their progeny.      
 
C.  The Legislative Intent 
It is particularly interesting to examine the legislature’s reasons for abandoning the 
traditional waiver system in which the judge had to consider numerous individual factors before 
transferring a juvenile to adult court.  Absent any official statement by the legislature‚ the intent 
of the lawmakers can be inferred from examining the House Bill Analysis of the Juvenile Justice 
Reform Package83 and the cases interpreting the law.  The automatic waiver provision was 
originally introduced in a package of bills addressing Michigan’s treatment of juvenile offenders.  
The primary motivation behind the legislation was to “combat the growing menace of juvenile 
crime in our society.”84 
 According to the House Bill Analysis, the traditional waiver system was “designed to 
deal with youthful offenders who committed far less heinous crimes than the current generation 
                                                 
82 See Fields, 388 Mich. at 66, 199 N.W.2d at 221-22. 
83 HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION‚ JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM PACKAGE‚ SB. 281‚ 283‚ 682‚ 689‚ 699‚ 
700‚ 867‚ 870; HB. 4307‚ 4371‚ 4445‚ 4486‚ 4487‚ 4490 (Mich. 1996). 
84 Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for 
Leave to Appeal.  People v. Conat; See House Legislative Analysis Juvenile Justice Reform Package (Senate Bills 
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of youthful criminals.”85  It was believed that, because of this leniency, society was being 
confronted with an increase in the number of serious juvenile offenders.86  The legislature 
believed that the best way to deal with these serious juvenile offenders was to “have them tried 
and sentenced as adults.”87  In order to achieve this goal, the legislature felt that it had to make 
the waiver system much more strict.  It was seen as a weakness in the original system that “a 
juvenile tried in circuit court would not necessarily be subjected to an adult sentence.”88  It was 
believed that requiring mandatory adult sentences would “induce juveniles to take more seriously 
the consequences of their actions.”89 
 The legislature believed that automatic waiver would offer a reasonable solution to the 
problem of “how effectively to deal with violent and hardened juvenile criminals without 
sacrificing the opportunity to rehabilitate salvageable delinquents within the juvenile system.”90  
The drafters of the bill intended that the automatic waiver would “provide the system with 
maximum flexibility to protect the public from violent juvenile criminals while preserving the 
rehabilitative aspects of juvenile court for offenders who can benefit from them.”91  The 
legislature attempted to ensure the availability of rehabilitation for “those offenders who can 
benefit from [rehabilitation]” by creating a system in which the prosecutor, alone, decides 
whether juveniles convicted of specific violent crimes would be required to receive adult 
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sentences.92  The justification for the imposition of mandatory adult sentences is that: 
Since some violent youthful offenders are not amenable to rehabilitation, 
requiring the incarceration of the most violent juvenile offenders will serve to 
protect the public and will save juvenile rehabilitation resources for less serious 
offenders who will more likely benefit from rehabilitative efforts . . . Requiring 
the courts to review and consider the unique circumstances of each case (except 
those where an adult sentence is required) allows for the sentencing of the 
juvenile to be specific to the needs of the particular juvenile.93 
 
 The legislature believed that it was appropriate to tie the charging decision to a 
mandatory adult sentence because the prosecuting attorney has access to all of the information 
necessary to make such a decision, and “as an elected county official, his or her decisions reflect 
the community’s priorities.”94 
 
D.  Michigan Cases Interpreting Michigan’s Juvenile Justice Laws 
Case law addressing Michigan’s Juvenile Waiver statue is sparse.  In fact, People v. 
Conat95 is the first case in Michigan to specifically address the current automatic waiver 
provision.  The Michigan cases prior to Conat that have dealt with the juvenile justice system 
have focused on the system in general, traditional waiver, due process‚ and equal protection 
issues. 
1. People v. Hana96 
 In 1993, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v. Hana in which it addressed the 
issue of whether due process and equal protection apply to the dispositional as well as the 
                                                 
92 HOUSE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS SECTION‚ JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM PACKAGE‚ at 11. 
93 Id. at 11. 
94 Id. at 11 
95 238 Mich. App. 134‚ 605 N.W.2d 49 (1999). 
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adjudicatory phases of a juvenile waiver hearing.97  In holding that these constitutional rights do 
not apply to the dispositional phase, the court examined the treatment of this issue by the United 
States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States98 and Gault v. United States.99 
 The Kent holding requires that juvenile waiver hearings include a degree of procedural 
regularity that comports with the basic requirements of due process.100  Gault assured that 
juveniles have the right to counsel in a juvenile waiver proceeding.101  The Hana court‚however‚ 
held that neither of these holdings required such constitutional protections in the dispositional 
phase of the waiver hearing “that focuses on balancing the interests of both the juvenile and the 
public.”102  It is on this basis that the Hana court distinguished Michigan’s waiver law from the 
holdings in Kent and Gault.  Accordingly‚ the majority in Hana held that “[t]he legislative 
purpose and the underpinnings of the Probate Code mandate the conclusion that a probate court’s 
discretion at the dispositional phase of a waiver hearing remains unfettered by certain evidentiary 
requirements recognized in criminal proceedings and already extended to the adjudicative phase 
of a hearing.”103 
 Chief Justice Michael Cavanagh wrote the dissenting opinion in Hana arguing that, 
contrary to the majority’s holding‚ the decision to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile is not 
consistent with the “rehabilitative ideal” on which the juvenile system is based.104  Chief Justice 
Cavanagh pointed out that if the court were to follow the rehabilitative purpose of the legislature 
then “as a matter of logic‚ waiver could only be appropriate when a better means of rehabilitation 
                                                 
97 See Hana, 443 Mich. at 209, 504 N.W.2d at 169. 
98 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
99 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
100 Kent‚ 383 U.S. at 553. 
101 Gault 387 U.S. at 7. 
102 Hana‚ 443 Mich. 202‚ 219‚ 504 N.W.2d 166‚ 174. (emphasis added.) 
103 Id. at 204‚ 504 N.W.2d at 167. 
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– that is‚ a better process of removing the juvenile’s desire to misbehave – exists in juvenile 
court.”105  According to Chief Justice Cavanagh‚ the criminal courts “as a practical matter” will 
“never provide a better rehabilitative process than the juvenile court.”106  Therefore‚ “the 
decision to waive [juvenile offenders to adult court] cannot be characterized as being consistent 
with the philosophy underlying the juvenile court system.”107  
2. People v. Veling108 
The Michigan Supreme Court examined the 1988 automatic waiver statute again in the 
1993 case, People v. Veling.109  In Veling‚ the defendants challenged Michigan’s automatic 
waiver statute110 on the grounds that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to sentence juveniles who 
are charged with enumerated offenses but convicted of nonenumerated lesser included 
offenses.111  Under the 1988 Act, the prosecutor had the discretion to file charges directly in 
adult court for enumerated offenses.112  If the prosecutor originally filed a charge for a 
nonenumerated offense, it could only have been filed in the juvenile court.  As such, the 
defendants in Veling argued that conviction of the nonenumerated lesser included offense 
divested the circuit court of jurisdiction.113   
Once a juvenile has been convicted of an enumerated offense for a charge that was 
waived to adult court under the 1988 Act, the circuit court judge had authority to conduct a 
hearing to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced as an adult or a juvenile.114  It is 
                                                 
105 Hana, 443 Mich. at 228, 504 N.W.2d at 178. 
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108 443 Mich. 23, 504 N.W.2d 456 (1993). 
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110 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.606 
111 Veling, 443 Mich. at 27, 504 N.W.2d at 458. 
112 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.1f. 
113 Veling, 443 Mich. at 28, 504 N.W.2d at 458. 
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because of this authority vested in the circuit judge to decide each case on an individualized basis 
that the Michigan Supreme Court ruled against the defendant.115  Especially interesting is the 
court’s finding that the automatic waiver statute which gives the circuit court judge discretion in 
sentencing is preferable to the traditional waiver statute in which a juvenile tried as an adult must 
be sentenced as an adult.116  Indeed, the court held that “giving a circuit judge sentencing 
discretion for both types of offenses [more serious charges as well as less serious charges] under 
the automatic waiver statute provides the greatest flexibility in dealing with juvenile 
offenders.”117 
3. People v. Black118 
 In People v. Black, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the 
1988 automatic waiver provision of the juvenile code against a separation of powers 
challenge.119 As stated, under the 1988 Act, the prosecutor could charge a juvenile as an adult 
but before the court imposed an adult sentence, a hearing had to be held by the court in order to 
determine how best to serve the interests of the juvenile and the public.120  As with any judicial 
action, the courts’ determinations were subject to review by the appellate court.     
The Defendant in Black was a juvenile who was tried as an adult pursuant to section 
764.1(f).121  She was found guilty of premeditated murder and armed robbery and, after a 
hearing, the trial court found that the best interests of the public and the juvenile would be served 
by imposing an adult sentence.122  As such, the Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without 
                                                 
115 See Veling, 443 Mich. at 39, 504 N.W.2d at 463. 
116 See id. at 40, 504 N.W.2d at 464. 
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118 203 Mich. App. 428, 513 N.W.2d 152 (1994). 
119 See Black, 203 Mich. App. at 431, 513 N.W.2d at 154. 
120 See supra note 126. 
121 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.1(f). 
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the possibility of parole.123  
 Defendant appealed as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals on the ground that the 
automatic waiver law violates the separation of powers doctrine.124  Defendant argued that the 
automatic waiver provision gives prosecutors authority that should be exercised by the 
judiciary.125  The court, in ruling against Defendant, held that the automatic waiver provision 
simply vests with the circuit court the power to hear certain cases and that, although prosecutors 
are given the discretion to decide in which court to proceed, all judicial power continues to be 
exercised by the judiciary.126  The appellate court, therefore, relying on the fact that the trial 
judge held the required hearing before imposing an adult sentence‚ affirmed the trial court’s 
decision.127 
4. People v. Haynes128 
In the consolidated case of People v. Haynes,129 three juvenile defendants pleaded guilty 
to first-degree murder and other felonies.  In each case, the prosecution appealed, alleging that 
the defendants should have been sentenced as adult offenders to mandatory term of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.130  The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded in each case.131  The Michigan Supreme Court denied the defendants’ applications for 
leave to appeal.132  Chief Justice Cavanagh and Justice Levin wrote separately to state that they 
would grant leave to appeal and to express their disagreement with the lack of sentencing 
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discretion afforded to the court under section 769.1 of the juvenile waiver statute.133   
Chief Justice Cavanagh wrote: 
I write separately to urge the legislature to amend M.C.L. § 769.1; M.S.A.            
§ 28.1072 to provide a broader range of sentencing discretion in cases involving 
automatic waiver of juveniles.  The interests of public safety can be served 
without forcing the trial court into the all-or-nothing choice of placing a person 
sixteen or seventeen years old in the juvenile system until the age of twenty-one‚ 
or placing that same person in the adult system for a nonparolable term of natural 
life.134 
 
 
III.  WHY THE SYSTEM IS NOT WORKING 
As gleaned from Michigan case law and the Michigan House Bill Analysis,135 the drafters 
of the bill intended that the automatic waiver would “provide the system with maximum 
flexibility to protect the public from violent juvenile criminals while preserving the rehabilitative 
aspects of juvenile court for juvenile offenders who can benefit from them.”136  The legislature 
proceeded to take measures to ensure the availability of rehabilitation for “those offenders who 
can benefit from [rehabilitation]”137 by creating a system in which the prosecutor alone decides 
which offenders will be tried and sentenced in juvenile court and which in adult court.   
The difficulty in understanding how this goal can be accomplished lies in the glaring fact 
that the legislature provides absolutely no guidance for prosecutors in making their charging 
decisions.  Such a delegation is especially troublesome considering the fact that the prosecutor’s 
charging decision is unreviewable on appeal.  Further troubling is the fact that the prosecutor, 
unlike the judge, is not a neutral arbiter in a criminal proceeding but rather is a party to the 
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litigation. 
The legislature tried to justify its decision to delegate such broad authority to the 
prosecutor by pointing out that the prosecutor has access to the juvenile’s records and would be 
able to make an educated decision reflecting the public sentiment.138  Curiously missing from 
this analysis is the fact that the prosecutor is an elected official whose job often depends on the 
satisfaction of the public and that it is a given that the public may not always be interested in the 
best interests of the juvenile defendant.  This fact alone ensures that the prosecutor’s judgment 
will not always be in the best interest of the juvenile defendant.   
The very structure of the court system is designed such that two adversarial parties can 
have their dispute decided by a neutral party, the judge.  The goal of the prosecutor in a criminal 
proceeding necessarily will not comport with the goals of a defendant in a criminal proceeding.  
The nature of the criminal justice system characterizes the prosecutor and the defendant as 
adversaries.  The goal of the prosecutor is to get a conviction and, naturally, to achieve public 
acceptance.  The purpose of providing a separation between the prosecution and the defendant in 
the form of the judge is to ensure that the defendant is afforded justice.   
It is undeniably clear that the public will not always want justice for a criminal defendant.  
Lacking a great deal of information, the public is much more likely to judge a criminal defendant 
based on personal biases and fear.  It is impossible to decide if a juvenile is amenable to 
treatment without taking into consideration the juvenile offender’s background.  While it is true 
that the prosecutor has access to such information, far more powerful is the prosecutor’s 
understandable sense of responsibility to the public and desire for a conviction. 
This is just the beginning of why Michigan’s juvenile justice laws fail dismally to meet 
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the goal of reducing juvenile crime.  As discussed at the beginning of this paper, juveniles who 
are transferred to adult court actually receive more lenient sentences than those who remain in 
the juvenile system.139  The few that are actually sentenced in the adult system are more likely to 
be sexually and physically assaulted in an adult facility,140 and do not receive the education and 
therapy programs provided in the juvenile system.  As a result, after these kids serve their time in 
adult prison they are returned to us with no new skills to help them become productive members 
of society.  Indeed, after release from adult prison, juvenile offenders are usually tougher, more 
educated on crime, and more dangerous to the community.141 
Although it would seem logical to adopt public policy based on what is known to work, 
the Michigan legislature chooses to ignore all of the studies and statistics reporting that waiver of 
juvenile offenders is an ineffective way to decrease juvenile crime.  The two main studies which 
have shown the effect of transfer on rates of recidivism both conclusively show that, contrary to 
the intentions of legislators, transferred youth, even those who are incarcerated for long periods 
of time, display a significantly higher rate of recidivism in a shorter time following incarceration 
than those similarly situated youth who were not transferred.142  This is true for all types of 
offenses.143  Further, transferred youth are more likely to commit subsequent felony offenses.  In 
addition, more juvenile offenders who were not transferred have substantially improved their 
behavior over time.144    
Unfortunately, the current state of juvenile justice in Michigan is borne out of fear and 
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ignorance.  Even more tragic is the fact that alternative exist, the Michigan legislature just 
chooses to ignore them.     
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE                                     
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION IN MICHIGAN 
 
A child who is not taught basic coping and socialization skills early in life is going to 
have problems with coping and socialization skills later in life unless there is some intervention.  
Likewise a child exposed to or victimized by violence at a young age will have a higher 
propensity to commit violence.145  These very basic facts scream for prevention.  Currently, it is 
possible to identify certain risk factors in neighborhoods, families, and individuals.  It is possible 
to link risk factors to certain outcomes.  By looking at these statistics it possible to deal with at-
risk kids before they enter into the juvenile justice system.  Alas, the Michigan legislature has 
chosen to promulgate a juvenile justice bill shown by study after study to fail at decreasing 
juvenile crime.  Until prevention can be fit into a catchy campaign slogan it appears that the 
“justice” in juvenile justice is going to rule policy in Michigan. 
The current trend of waiving juvenile offenders is reactionary and ill-conceived policy.  
Although the causes of juvenile crime are hotly debated, many agree that most causes are 
reversible.  It is as simple as asking any adult to take a look at the kind of person they were when 
they were fifteen years old compared to now.  Most adults can remember decisions they regret 
and can remember behaviors that they have changed.  Add into that equation just one stumbling 
block such as poverty, neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, mental abuse, a learning disorder, a 
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mental illness, loss of a loved one, violence, drugs, gangs, etc.  Even without the cards stacked 
against them, however, adolescents in general are not cognitively and morally developed.  Thus, 
policy that generically classifies adolescents holding all of them to the same standard ignores 
basic human nature.   
Because adolescents are cognitively and morally immature, the proper approach to deal 
with an adolescent’s delinquent behavior must focus on development and rehabilitation.  
Adolescents are, by nature, egocentric.  As such, rehabilitation and training in a social setting is 
most conducive to effectively dealing with chronic delinquents.  In a social setting, juveniles can 
be given systematic training in social perspective taking skills where the juvenile is put into 
controlled situations that force them to adapt to the perspectives of another.  Such a setting can 
take place in a secure facility such as a group home or residential facility.  However, the key to 
success is focusing on the individual’s treatment, education and rehabilitation.   
    
CONCLUSION 
   Obviously, it is important to figure out how to stem the tide of juvenile crime.  Equally 
important, however, is how to get rid of social policies that are punitive, born out of fear, not 
based in reality or statistics and simply do not work.  The current trend of prosecutorial waiver 
and mandatory sentencing for juveniles removes the individualized determinations of a child’s 
amenability to treatment.  Indeed, a child in the system today faces fewer rights and more 
sanctions that he has in decades.  In order to reduce juvenile crime and rehabilitate troubled 
youth, it is clear that public policy must begin to address the unmet needs of our young people on 
an individual basis. 
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